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Abstract 
In this article we study the factors that affect the transitions out of unemployment in Spain. 
We pay special attention to the impact of unemployment insurance benefits on the re-employment 
probability. We use a multinomiallogit model, and data from the EPA matched files from the 
second quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 1995. Consistent with previous work, we find a 
negative effect of unemployment insurance receipt on the re-employment probability, and on 
withdrawal from the labor force. More importantly, we find a differential effect of benefit receipt 
when comparing time periods before and afier 1992. In april of that year the labor authority made 
eligibility requirements for unemployment insurance more restrictive, and curtailed benefit 
amounts. 
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1. Introduction 
The number of unemployed workers at a given time is the net balance of flows in and out of 
unemployment. The unemployment rate increases if inflows grow faster than outflows. Spain's labor 
market offers a good example of how unemployment steadily rises when the economy is unable to 
create jobs for new entrants and for displaced workers: in the mid-70s the unemployment rate was 
around 4 percent, ten years later the rate had climbed to almost 22 percent (see Figure 1). Labor 
market rigidities have repeatedly been blamed for such a negative and long lasting labor shedding 
process. 1 
Although the Spanish labor market ofthe 1990s is far more flexible than that of the 1970s or 
ear1y 1980s, the exit rate from unemployment is still considered low, even by European standards.2 
Hence, the high and persistent unemployment rate that exists. Such arate diminished significantly in 
the second half of the 1980s. The 1984 employment promotion program -based on fostering fixed­
term employment contracts- reduced employers' reluctance to hire new workers. The reason being 
that dismissing (temporary) workers became much easier, and also cheaper. Lured by the advantages 
of the new employment relationship, employers replaced permanent employees with temporary ones, 
to the extent that in 1991 a third of the employed had a fixed-term contract. 
More recently, unemployment again rose quickly in Spain: by 8 percentage points from 1991 
to 1994. Although this can largely be attributed to a cyc1ical downturn, the depth of the employment 
crisis raises sorne questions about the dynamics of the Spanish labor market. For instance, how is the 
use of fixed-term contracts affecting the flow into unemployment? What factors are determinants of 
the flow out of unemployment? 
This artic1e takes the latter strand of analysis to contribute to a better understanding of the 
dynamics of the Spanish labor market. We study the determinants of the transitions out of 
unemployment by using a multinomial logit model. Such framework permits to estimate the effects of 
a number of variables on an individual's transition from unemployment to either employment or 
See Blanchard and Jimeno (1995), for sorne explanations. 
2 See OECD (1987). 
1 
I 
inactivity. The data used are obtained from matched files of the quarterly labor force survey (EPA), 
for the period 1987.2 to 1995.4. This period includes a complete business cycle, with a high in 1991 
and a trough in 1993. The employment recovery has been slow since the latter date. To reduce 
heterogeneity we consider men aged 20-59 who possess work experience and are unemployed at a 
given quarter of the period 1987.2-1995.4. Within that period, we study unemployment outtlows as 
indicated by workers' ,labor market status in two consecutive quarters. 
One of the main results in this article is that we find a differential effect of unemployment 
insurance on the re-employment probability when comparing periods before and after 1992. We are 
tempted to interpret this finding as a consequence of the unemployment insurance reform in April 
1992, which tightened eligibility requirements and curtailed benefit amounts. 
2. Conceptual Framework: A Multinomial Logit 
To study the determinants of labor market transitions, we use a multinomial logit model 
(Maddala (1983».3 The probability that an unemployed person in quarter t is observed employed or 
out of the labor force in quarter t +1, can be expressed as a conditional expectation function, P(Y = 
k 1 X) = Pki' where k= 1,2,3 if individual i becomes employed, leaves the labor force or remains 
unemployed, respectively; and X is a vector of individual characteristics and other factors that affect 
labor market transitions. 
The probability that individual i experiences a transition from unemployment to employment 
is: 
exp(X¡/'I) 
Pli = -----------------------------------­
1 + exp(Xfll) + exp(Xfl0 
and the probability that the individualleaves the labor force is: 
3 This framework has been used by a number of studies. For example Barron and Mellow (1981), 

and Poterba and Surnmers (1995). 
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P2i = -----------------------------------­
1 + exp(X¡#1¡) + exp(X/32) 
Among the set of explanatory variables, X, we inelude demographic characteristics (age, 
education, marital status); variables related to the individual's previous labor market experience 
(reason for job loss, sector of employment, duration of previous job, activity before starting job 
search); variables related to the job search process (whether attending school/following training 
courses while looking for work or not, time out of work and searching for a job, situatíon with 
respect to the public employment office and whether or not receiving unemployment insurance 
benefits); a dummy to take into account the pressure or willingness to take a jobo To control for the 
influence of the business cycle on labor market transitions we include in the regression yearly 
dummies. AIso, to control for seasonal variations we inelude dummies for the initial quarter. 
Moreover, we inelude dummies for rotatíon groups in the EPA sample. 
Among the factors that can affect the transitions out of unemployment we pay special attention 
to receipt of unemployment insurance benefits (U1), duration of the unemployment spell, and the 
business cyc1es as picked up by yearly dummies. Furthermore, we create interaction terms between 
VI receipt and unemployment duratíon, and between UI receipt and yearly dummies. These 
interaction terms serve to test how the UI receipt effect on the re-employment probability depends on 
the other two variables. 
3. Data: The Active Population Survey (EPA) 
The data used are obtained from the Active Population Survey (EPA), a quarterly sample of 
sorne 60,000 households. These data set is suitable for analyzing employment transitions because of 
its panel structure. As a sixth of the EPA sample rotates every quarter, in principIe we can follow a 
person for a maximum of six quarters. Matched EPA files have recently been made available by the 
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). Place of residence, and the code to ídentify members of 
the same household have been dropped from the matched files. Age is available as grouped in five 
year brackets, and other variables are also avaílable only in a more compres sed format than the 
original one. 
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The time period available expands from the second quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 
1995. This period includes part of the phase of strong employment growth that lasted until the early 
1990's, the deep employment crisis of 1992 and 1993, and the weak recovery that started in 1994. 
Therefore, the data permit to analyze labor market transitions over a complete cycle of the Spanish 
economy. 
,In this article we first use a general sample, and later a slightly more restricted one. For 
selecting the larger sample we start with a11 men aged 20-59,4 unemployed at a given quarter of the 
period 1987.2 to 1995.4, after having worked before. By retaining those persons who were 
interviewed in the subsequent quarter, we obtain a sample of 130,669 observations.s Then we 
exclude workers for whom the variable values for time since leaving the previous job, unemployment 
duration or situation with respect to the employment office are missing (2,541 observations). Because 
information on previous job's characteristics is only available for people who left their job less than 
36 months ago, we exclude 19,169 observations where such information is missing. AIso, we exclude 
workers who reported unemployment duration of more than 36 months (2,885 observations).6 We are 
left with a sample of 106,174 observations. The restricted sample, to be described later, serves to take 
a closer look at the effect of unemployment insurance on labor market transition probabilities. 
In the following section we present the maximum likelihood estimates of the multinomial logit 
parameters. We adopt the usual normalizatíon rule of setting the parameters equal to zero in the 
equation for those who remain unemployed in the subsequent quarter. 
4 We concentrate on men because we lack the relevant information on family background which is 
crucial for studying labor market transitions of women, such as number of other members in the 
household and their labor market situation. 
s Because of the EPA's rotatíon scheme, a sixth of the individual s ínterviewed in a given quarter is 
not present in the subsequent quarter. Of the remaining sample, about 15 per cent is lost because of 
attrition. 
6 Workers who report unemployment duration -time looking for ajob-Ionger than time since leaving 
the previous job may have started their job search well before becoming unemployed. Otherwíse, the 
discrepancy between the two variables may result from error. 
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4. Results 
To study the determinants of exit rates from unemployment to employment and out of the 
labor force, we consider the labor force status in quarter t +1 of unemployed men in quarter t. In the 
sample used, of aH unemployed men in a given quarter of the time period available, 24.85 percent 
obtained a job in the subsequent quarter, and 3.93 percent left the labor force. Table 1 contains the 
results of estimating the multinomial logit model that can be applied to the data, as well as the 
corresponding derivatives.7 
As expected, the re-employrnent probability decreases with age. Such probability is a third 
lower for 50-54 year olds, and a half lower for those aged 55-59, as compared with the average 
worker in the sample. On the other hand, workers in these two age groups are significantly more 
likely to drop out of the labor force. Workers 55-59 years old are twice as likely to leave the labor 
force as the average individual in the sample. The variable education increases the likelihood of re­
employment only for workers with vocational education. Married men are also more likely to become 
employed and less likely to leave the labor force by 33 percent and 28 percent, respectively. 
Unemployed men attending school or foHowing training courses are less likely to become 
employed and more likely to drop out of the labor force. Workers in this situation, 4.7 percent of the 
sample, have low attachment to the labor force because their opportunity cost of unemployment is 
probably low. An indicator of labor force attachment or pressure to accept a job can be obtained 
through a dummy that we call 11 willingness to accept a job ". It takes on one if the worker indicates 
that he is ready to take a job even though it implies moving, changing the type of work, and lower 
than expected wage and occupation. Around 29 percent of unemployed men report to be williÍlg to 
accept a job under those conditions. Despite that disposition, their re-employment probability is 
significantly lower than that for comparable workers. However, those workers' determinatíon to 
obtaín a job appears reflected in their hígher attachment to the labor market: they are 21 percent less 
likely to leave the labor force than the average unemployed man in the sample who is not willing to 
accept a job under the referred conditions. 
7 For the transition from unemployrnent to the jth situatíon, the marginal effect of an exogenous 
variable, x, is obtained at the sample means applyíng the formula: op/l)X = Pj(!3j - E Pk!3k)' where k =1,2. 
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Most experienced workers indicated that dght before starting their work search they had 
separated from a jobo However, there are workers in the sample who indicated that they were not 
working. We have included in the regressions dummies to control for those who were in school (2 
percent), or were in the military, doing housework or other activity (4 percent). Those who were 
students prior to looking for work are significantly more likely to leave the labor force. We can 
distinguish people who were working prior to their job search by the reason for job 10ss; the main 
reason being end of contract (72 percent). Workers laid off and job leavers for other reasons (early 
retirement, quitting, etc.) are less likely to become employed and more likely to drop out of the labor 
force than those whose contract ended. This result reflects the fact that workers with a fixed-term 
contract move more often from one job to the other. It means that they are more employable and, at 
the same time, that they share a higher risk of experiencing unemployment. Hence, there is a higher 
labor turnover resulting from the institution of fixed-term contracts. 
Dummies for sector of employment show that re-employment probabilities are particularly 
high among agriculture sector (farming and fishing) workers, and strikingly low among service sector 
workers. The result for agriculture workers is no surprise given the usually short duration of 
agriculture jobs. This implies that workers are obliged to move from job to job with high frequency. 
The result for the service sector cannot be so easi1y justified. It may be due to the fact that service 
sector workers form a very heterogeneous group. Tenure in the previous job of one year or more 
reduces the likelihood of becoming employed. Workers who held their previous job for 3 years or 
longer are 14 percent less likely to become employed than the average worker in the sample. If that 
job was in the public sector, the re-employment probability decreases further, and the probability of 
leaving the labor force increases. 
Before discussing the effects on labor market transitions of unemployment duration, year1y 
dummies, and the situation with respect to the employment office, sorne comments on the effects of 
seasonal and rotation group dummies are in order. Seasonal dummies refer to the initíal quarter of the 
two consecutive quarters from which we assess labor market transitions. We find that the probability 
of transition to employment increases significantly in the second and forth quarters of the year. Note 
that the second quarter marks the beginning of tourist sector jobs, and the fourth quarter dummy may 
pick up the Christmas and New-Year job openings. On the other hand, the probability of leaving the 
labor force appears higher for the third and forth quarters. Regarding the rotation group dummies, it 
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seems that workers in the fifth interview show a higher probability to become employed. AIso, 
workers in the third, forth and fifth interview seem to be more likely to become inactive. The finding 
of these rotation group effects indicates sorne bias in the individual's responses. In particular, the 
effect on transition out of the labor force may indicate that sorne people are borderline between 
unemployment and inactivity. If asked a sufficient number of consecutive quarters, their responses 
tend to be closer to the tatter status. 
2.1. Unemployment Duration, Yearly dummies and Unemployment 1nsurance 
The effects of unemployment duration, yearly durnmies and unemployment insurance benefits 
on labor market transitions deserve separate consideration, particularly because they are related to 
each other. First we focus on the independent effects of these variables as reported in Table 1. It is 
clear from Table 1 that unemployment duration durnmies have a negative and very significant impact 
on employment transitions. The re-employment probability decreases as time out of work extends. It 
is apparent that the effect is roughly linear up to the second year out of work. On the other hand, no 
effect of unemployment duration on the probability of leaving the labor force is obtained, except for 
the fact that the dummy 12-23 months obtains a negative and significant coefficient. 
Yearly dummies are deemed to pick up the economic cycle effect on employment transitions. 
They also obtain very significant coefficients as reflected in Table 1. The re-employment probability 
increased up to 1989, decreased in 1992, plummeted in 1993, and started to recover in 1994. Years 
1992 and 1993 are of strong employment decline in Spain (see Figure 1). Thereafter the employment 
recovery has been slow. Regarding the transition to inactivity, the coefficients for yearly dummies are 
positive and significant from 1990 to 1994. Although the decline in re-employment probability is 
deepest in 1993 (37 percent), the increase in the probability of leaving the labor force is largest in 
1992 (78 percent). This is probably related to the kind of employment adjustment that took place in 
Spain at the time: many permanent workers lost their jobs at the early stages of the employment 
crisis. Because these are more likely to be older workers, they are expected to show a higher 
propensity to retire early. 
Assessing the impact of the unemployment insurance benefits on labor market transitions with 
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the data at hand poses several problems.8 Certainly we can construct dummies from the survey 
question which asks of workers to indicate their situation with respect to the public employment office 
(INEM). The possible answers are: (1) Register receiving sorne kind of unemployment insurance 
benefits, (2) Register without receiving benefits, and (3) Not registered. On average, 47 percent of 
unemployed men in the sample report to be receiving unemployment benefits at a given quarter, and 5 
percent indicate not to be registered at the INEM. The problem with this information is that sorne 
unemployed people may have applied for UI and could be waiting for response from the INEM at the 
moment of survey interview. Because information on the application for benefits is not available in 
the EPA, we can stíll look at the situation with respect to the employment office in the subsequent 
quarter. By doing so, we find that 15 percent of the unemployed not receiving UI at the sample's 
initial quarter report to be receiving benefits in the subsequent quarter (8,279 persons). 
If we consider UI recipients workers who receive benefits at the initial or subsequent quarter, 
we obtain a better measure of the number of people on unemployment insurance. However, by doing 
this we are likely to overestimate the (negative) effect on the re-employment probability of the UI 
receipt variable. The reason is that we do not observe situations in which after having applied for UI, 
the worker became re-employed even though UI actually was or could have been granted. With these 
shortcomings in mind, we can still estimate the UI effect on labor market transitions by creating 
dummies for each of the three possible situations at the employment office. We try three possibilities: 
first, we create the UI dummy that takes on one if the worker is registered and receives UI either in 
the initial or the subsequent quarter; second, we redefine such dummy by making it equal to one only 
if the worker is registered and receives benefits in the initial quarter; and third, we estimate the 
multinomial regressions excluding the unemployed who were not receiving benefits in the initial 
quarter and indicated to be doing so in the subsequent quarter. The first strategy corresponds to that 
of Table 1, and the particular results from the other two cases are contained in Table 2. 
As Table 1 shows, receipt of benefits as defined in this case, reduces significantIy the re­
employment probability by .1118, which represents a 50 percent decline with respect to that of the 
sample average worker who is registered but does not receive benefits. AIso, it is found that the 
11 The effect ofunemployment insurance on labor market transitions has ben explored in many studies. 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) surveyed the literature. For Spain there are several studies, one of the 
earliest is Alba-Ramírez and Freeman (1990), and one of the most recent is Bover el al. (1996). 
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dummy for not being registered at the employment office obtains a positive and significant coefficient, 
although the derivative is small. In addition, receipt of benefits significantly reduces the probability of 
leaving the labor force, and absent INEM registration increases it by 50 percent. 
As indicated earlier, the definition for UI receipt dummy used in Table 1 can overestimate 
such a variable's effect on the empl~yment transition. To gauge the extent to which that can happen 
we also use the two alternative strategies described aboye. Table 2 shows that when we define the UI 
dummy as equal to one only when the worker is receiving benefits in the initial quarter, its effect on 
employment transition is significant, albeit quite small. The derivative is one tenth of that reported in 
Table 1. Moreover, by exc1uding UI claimants who were granted benefits with delay (as we can find 
out by looking at the subsequent quarter), we obtain a positive and significant coefficient for the 
impact of UI receipt dummy on transition to employment. In this case the derivative is .0733, which 
translates to a reduction in the re-employment probability of 27.5 percent, almost balf of the reduction 
in the expected probability obtained from estimates in Table 1. Thus, although it is hard to estimate 
the actual impact of UI receipt on employment transition with EPA data, we can say that the effect is 
quite strong and is likely to be c10se to the latter result reported.9 
2.2. Variations in the Effect of Unemployment lnsurance 
In this subsection we address the following questions: (1) Does the effect of UI on labor 
market transitions vary across different lengths of unemployment duration? (2) Has such affect 
changed along the business cyc1e? and, (3) Has the 1992 reforms of the UI system affected the re­
employment probability of UI recipients? To answer these questions we use a more restricted data 
sample. We exc1ude workers whose previous job was in the agricultural sector (15,970 observations), 
or was not a wage and salary job (3,788 observations). By doing so, we expect to reduce 
heterogeneity in the sample, given that agriculture workers are subject to a different UI system, and 
that non wage/salary workers are not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. 
9 If we define the expected duration of unemployment spells as the inverse of the re-employment 
probability, it takes about 12 months to obtain ajob for the average worker in the sample. This period 
will be 6 months longer for UI recipients according to estimates in Table 1, and 3.3 months longer if we 
consider estimates in the lower panel of Table 2. 
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Table 3 reports the multinomial logit estimates for the particular dummy variables on which 
we focus our attention. 10 For UI receipt, we use the same definitíon as in Table 1: the corresponding 
dummy takes on one if the individual receives benefits in either the initial or the subsequent quarter. 
The multinomial logit regression is specified as in Table 1, except for the inclusion of interaction 
terms. The first panel of Table 3 shows that by restricting the sample, the coefficients for the dummy 
variables on which we are focusing do not change much with respect to those reported in Table 1. 
Given the rules of the Spanish unemployment insurance system (see Appendix 1), as time out 
of work lengthens, the amount of benefits received decreases. Thus, one can expect a progressive 
weakening of the UI (negative) effect on employment transition along the unemployment spell. To test 
this one needs to analyze re-employment probabilities according to UI status at different poínts of the 
unemployment spell. ll The data sample used in this article does not allow for this because we only 
observe labor market status at two consecutive quarters. 
The data contain a cross section of individuals whose incomplete unemployment spell -as 
reported in the initial quarter- can vary from one month to three years. Thus, we can estimate a 
multinomial logit model with interaction terms between duration dummies and the UI receipt dummy. 
By doing so, we are able to ascertain the UI effect on labor market transitions across different lengths 
of unemployment duration. The results are presented in the second panel of Table 3. It is clear that 
the negative effect of UI receipt on the re-employment probability is very strong for workers in the 
first two months of their unemployment spell, it is significantly smaller in the 3-5 month bracket, 
declines further for durations of 6-11 months, and decreases very Httle from there on. However, note 
that the effect is still quite important for VI recipients who have been unemployed for one year or 
longer. In the latter case, the re-employment probability declines by one third. This compares to a 
decline of more than 50 percent for VI recipients whose incomplete unemployment duration is shorter 
than six months. 
10 Fully reported results for Table 2 and for Table 3, are available from the author upon request. 
11 Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) present estimates of the variation of benefit effect throughout 
the unemployment spell in the United Kingdom. For Spain, Bover et al. (1996) find a declining hazard 
as unemployment duratíon íncreases. 
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We can also test bow tbe effect of UI receipt on tbe re-employment probability cbanged over 
tbe period 1987-1995. Tbis is an interesting exercise for at least two reasons. One reason is tbat in 
tbis period we observe a pbase of increasing employment, and another pbase of declining 
employment. Tbus, the data allow for exploring tbe effect of UI in a context of economic 
fluctuations. Otber reason is tbat unemployment insurance rules were modified in April 1992, making 
benefits significantIy less generous. As reflected in Appendix 1, sucb reform reduced duration and tbe 
amount of benefits. In addition, benefit became subject to tbe income tax since 1994. 
As tbe third panel of Table 3 sbows, sorne of tbe interaction terms between UI receipt and 
yearly dummies are significantly different from zero, in particular UI*1994 and UI*1995, wbicb 
obtain a positive coefficient. On tbe otber band, UI*1992 obtains a negative and significant coefficient 
at tbe 10 percent level. Tbese results suggest tbat by making tbe unemployment insurance system less 
generous, tbe labor autbority reduced tbe negative incentive of benefits on the re-employment 
probability. However, tbe goal was acbieved with delay. In fact, the negative and significant 
coefficient for UI*1992 suggests tbat tbe re-employment probability among UI recipients was at its 
lowest in tbat year. Tbis may be related to tbe timing of tbe economic recession and, also, to tbe fact 
tbat many permanent workers lost tbeir jobs around tbat date. It is in 1993 wben tbe UI negative 
effect on tbe re-employment probability appears to start declining. Tbis is consistent witb the fact tbat 
it is not until tbe beginning of 1994 wben the majority of UI recipients bad become eligible under tbe 
new rules. 
As compared witb tbe average worker in tbe sample wbo was registered witbout benefits, tbe 
re-employment probability of a UI recipient was 30 percent lower in tbe period 1994-95, and about 
50 percent lower in the period 1987-91.12 Because tbe reform of tbe UI system coincided witb tbe 
beginning of a period of labor sbake out, followed by a weak recovery, its impact was probably 
smaller tban it could bave been in a pbase of employment growtb. If tbe effect of UI on tbe re­
employment probability depends on tbe business cyc1e, we cannot separate out tbe latter's contribution 
to tbe observed weakening of tbe UI effect from tbat attributable to tbe UI reformo Because tbe data 
used comprises a wbole business cyc1e, we are more confident tbat the law cbange bas been 
12 We also estimated separated equations for several time periods, and found tbe cbange in UI dummy 
impact on tbe re-employment probability to be tbe most noticeable difference in estimates by periods. 
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determinant. 13 
5. Conclusions and Interpretations 
In this artiele we eontribute to studying the dynamies of the Spanish labor market. We 
analyzed the determinants of the transitions out of unemployment over the period 1987-95. We 
devoted speeial attention to the effeet on the re-employment probability of the following variables: 
receipt of unemployment benefits, duration of the unemployment spell, and the business eycle as 
proxied by yearly dummies. For analyzing the effeet of VI receipt on labor market transitions using 
EPA matched files, we pointed out sorne problems and offered alternative estimates. Moreover, we 
used interaetion terms for testing the VI impaet on the re-employment probability along the 
unemployment spell and throughout the period 1987-1995. 
Despite data limitations, we found a negative and significant impaet of VI receipt on the 
transition to employment and also on the transition to inactivity. In addition, the effect on the re­
employment probability appears stronger for shorter spells of unemployment, but it is still quite high 
for unemployment durations longer than one year. More importantly, we obtained evidence of a 
differential effeet of VI over the period of study. Although in 1993 the negative effect of VI receipt 
on the re-employment declined, as indieated by the corresponding interaction term, it is in 1994 and 
1995 when the estimated effect became significantly smaller than in previous years. 
Given the modification of the unemployment insuranee law carried out in April 1992, one can 
interpret the latter result as a change in job seareh behavior among VI recipients. By reducing the 
generosity of the unemployment insurance system, the Spanish labor authority has provided a natural 
experiment for assessing the impact of unemployment insuranee on labor market transitions. It is 
beyond the seope of this paper to gauge the extent to which the new unemployment insuranee system 
has contributed and will eontribute to reduce unemployment in Spain. This is worth investigating, 
together with the effeets of eurtailed unemployment insurance benefits on labor market welfare. 
13 The faet that VI reform was in 1992 makes it harder to draw any eonclusion about possible ehanges 
of benefit effect on the re-employment probability over the business eyele. One eould expeet sueh effeet 
to inerease in reeessions years beeause, as found in this article, VI reeeipt diseourages workers from 
dropping out of the labor force. 
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'l'able 1 
Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Labor Market Transitions of 
Male Unemployed Workers 
Employment OLF Derivatives 
Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Sample 
Mean Employ. OLF 
Age 20-24 years .2421 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
-.0587 
-.1248 
- .1103 
2.58 
4.62 
3.56 
-.1254 
-.1922 
-.09l0 
2.42 
2.99 
1.23 
.2003 
.1420 
.1029 
-.00974 
-.02142 
-.01971 
-.00416 
-.00603 
-.00236 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
-.2055 
-.2599 
-.4498 
-.6865 
6.11 
7.22 
11.71 
16.57 
-.0672 
.0290 
.4277 
.9681 
0.84 
0.35 
5.51 
13.33 
.0881 
.0771 
.0744 
.0727 
-.03771 
-.04882 
-.08818 
.13766 
-.00053 
.00363 
.02054 
.04325 
No education .1529 
primary .0104 0.43 - .1371 2.75 .4015 .00328 -.00527 
Second. academ.. 0116 0.41 -.1534 2.53 .3199 .00366 -.00590 
Second. vocat. .1233 3.47 - .1100 1.43 .0876 .02410 -.00536 
University -.0362 0.74 .1038 1.18 .0379 -.00777 .00427 
Married .4278 21.79 -.1825 4.10 .4997 .08167 -.01107 
Attend school .2068 5.15 .9754 16.88 .0474 -.04814 .03884 
Willingness -.0565 3.39 -.2367 6.07 .2895 -.00824 -.00838 
Left a job 
Was in school .0035 0.06 .6259 7.35 
.9519 
.0190 -.00545 .02359 
Other .0290 0.74 .0954 1.19 .039l .00448 .00331 
End of contract .7248 
Laid-off -.1079 4.28 .1219 2.35 .1475 -.02133 .00565 
Other -.0913 3.19 .2948 5.46 .1275 -.01993 .01202 
Agriculture .1504 
Industry -.4342 15.55 -.1264 1. 96 .1982 -.07984 -.00053 
Construction -.3132 13.02 -.1012 1. 76 .3001 -.05750 -.00076 
Retail/hotel -.5094 17.88 -.0502 0.78 .1743 -.09463 .00307 
Other services -.5104 16.83 -.0781 1.16 .1768 -.09455 .00203 
Tenure <3 m. .2142 
3 5 months .0155 0.64 -.0682 1. 24 .1616 .00356 -.00272 
6 -11 .0347 1.47 -.1663 3.09 .2231 .00810 -.00662 
12-35 -.0673 2.60 -.1865 3.26 .1919 -.01074 -.00638 
36+ .1847 6.43 -.0078 0.13 .2089 -.03442 .00150 
private sect. .8425 
Public sect. -.0811 3.00 .1311 2.38 .1167 -.01642 .00574 
Other .0663 1.48 -.0357 0.42 .0406 .01274 -.00199 
First quarter .2497 
Second .09l0 4.40 .0126 0.27 .2619 .01686 -.00041 
Third -.0234 1.10 .1012 2.20 .2494 -.00535 .00405 
Forth -.0962 4.40 .1350 2.87 .2388 -.01928 .00603 
1st interview .2035 
2nd .0160 0.68 .0804 1.55 .2014 .00219 .00288 
3rd .0028 0.12 .1090 2.11 .2010 -.00053 .00408 
4th .0068 0.29 .1480 2.89 .1977 -.00017 .00552 
5th .0592 2.53 .1589 3.09 .1961 .00950 .00542 
Regist. at INEM .4703 
UI receipt -.6077 36.14 -.1695 4.41 .5536 -.11184 -.00046 
Not registered .0688 2.11 .5461 9.06 .0540 .00752 .01994 
Unem. dur.<3 m. .2602 
3 -5 months -.1609 7.74 -.0095 0.18 .1918 -.02995 .00121 
6 -11 -.4229 20.15 -.0457 0.94 .2199 -.07852 .00240 
12-24 -.7467 32.36 -.0970 1.96 .2092 -.13850 .00362 
24+ -.8787 30.71 .0117 0.21 .1187 -.16421 .00902 
Year 1987 .0718 
1988 .0839 2.35 .0355 0.38 .09l0 .01531 .00052 
1989 .1218 3.44 .0770 0.83 .0941 .02199 .00171 
1990 .0880 2.44 .1944 2.11 .0896 .01453 .00648 
1991 .0214 0.60 .4988 5.77 .0970 -.00086 .01862 
1992 .3256 9.23 .7325 9.12 .1226 -.06796 .03083 
1993 -.4724 13.85 .3313 4.10 .1631 -.09145 .01712 
1994 -.2606 7.74 .4529 5.65 .1627 -.05308 .01964 
1995 -.2117 5.81 .5246 6.14 .1076 -.04465 .02187 
Constant .1033 2.17 -3.2047 28.39 
P .2485 .0393 
Log likelihood -71,699 
Number of obse-rvations 106 t 174­
Note: The data are from the Active Population Survey (EPA). The sample is composed 
of unemployed men at a given quarter of the period 1987-95, who were interviewed 
in the subsequent quarter. See text for more details on sample selection. 
Table 2 
The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Benefits on Labor Market Transitions 
Multinomial Logit Estimates 
l. 	The dummy for receipt of UI takes on one if the worker receives UI in the 
initial quarter 
Employment OLF Derivatives 
Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Sample 
Mean Employ. OLF 
Regist.· at 
UI receipt 
INEM 
-.0564 3.42 -.1009 2.68 
.4703 
.4756 -.00954 -.00326 
Not registered .2751 8.47 .5746 9.56 .0540 .04576 .01901 
P .2485 .0393 
Log likelihood -72,349 
Number of observations 106,174 
2. 	Non UI recipients in the initial quarter who obtain benefits in the 
subsequent quarter are excluded 
Regist. at INEM .4301 
UI receipt -.3833 22.10 -.1570 3.85 .5158 -.07329 -.00190 
Not registered .1544 4.59 .5677 8.98 .0539 .02427 .01967 
P .2665 .0390 
Log likelihood -67,563 
Number of observations 97,895 
Note: See note to Table 1 for sample characteristics. 
'l'able 3 
The Effect of Vnemployment Insurance Benefits on Labor Market Transitions 
Multinomial Logit Estimates With and Without Interaction Terms 
lo Without interaction terms 
Employment OLF Derivatives 
Sample 
Coeff. t Coeff. t mean Employ. OLF 
Regist. at INEM (omitted) 
VI receipt -.6158 -31. 91 -.1189 -2.74 .5697 -.10764 .00103 
Not registered .0875 2.13 .5760 7.82 .0408 .01031 .02075 
2. With interaction terms between VI receipt and unemployment duration 
VI receipt 
Not registered 
-.9324 
.0777 
-28.49 
1. 88 
-.3338 
.5701 
-4.18 
7.73 
.5697 
.0408 
-.16160 
.00864 
-.00417 
.02062 
VI*3 -5 
VI*6 -11 
VI*12-23 
VI*24+ 
months .3688 
.4824 
.4909 
.5213 
7.58 
10.02 
9.68 
8.11 
.3332 
.2751 
.1585 
.4061 
2.82 
2.51 
1.47 
3.37 
.1265 
.1127 
.1374 
.1349 
.06213 
.08270 
.08525 
.08840 
.00917 
.00599 
.00155 
.01054 
3. With interaction terms between VI receipt and yearly dummies 
UI receipt -.6919 -10.52 .0246 0.15 .5697 -.12236 .00708 

Not registered .0928 2.26 .5738 7.78 .0408 .01127 .02062 

VI*1988 .1078 1. 27 -.0301 -0.14 .0437 .01930 -.00208 
VI*1989 -.0014 -0.01 -.0841 -0.39 .0494 .00050 -.00313 
VI*1990 -.0047 -0.05 -.3436 -1.67 .0501 .00221 -.01280 
VI*1991 -.0172 -0.20 .1377 0.70 .0607 -.00427 .00530 
UI*1992 .1474 -1. 80 -.1320 -0.73 .0775 -.02485 -.00362 
VI*1993 .1033 1. 30 -.2438 -1.34 .1032 .02041 -.01003 
VI*1994 .2990 3.86 -.2070 -1.15 .0953 .05463 -.01040 
VI*1995 .2350 2.85 -.2141 -1.13 .0548 .04338 -.01010 
P .2289 .0389 
Number of observations 86,414 
l. The sample is composed of unemployed men at a given quarter of the period 
1987-95, who were interviewed in the subsequent quarter, and had held a wage 
and salary job not in the agricultural sector. See text for more details on 
sample selection. 
2. Specification for the three multinomial regressions is similar to that 
fully reported in Table 1, except for the inclusion of interaction terms. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of employment and unemployment in Spain, 1976-95. 
Appendix 1 

The Unemployment Insurance System in Spain Before and After 1992 

1. Contributory system 
1.1. Duration of benefits 1.2. Amount of benefits 
Period of Duration of Period of Amount of benefits 

contribution benefits benefits 1984 1992 

1984 1992 

1-6 months 80 % 70 

1 -5 months o m. o m. 7-12 70 60 

6 -11 3 O 13-24 60 60 

12-17 6 4 

18-23 9 6 

24-29 12 8 

30-35 15 10 

36-41 18 12 

42-47 21 14 

48-53 24 16 

54-59 24 18 

60-65 24 20 

66-71 24 22 

>=72 24 24 

1. The period of contribution refers to social security contributions 
made during the 6 years (4 years before April 1992) of employment prior 
to the legal situation of unemployment, as recognized by the labor 
authority. 
2. The amount is determined as a percentage of the average wage in the 
previous 12 months (6 months before April 1992) of employment. Workers 
are banded in contribution brackets according to 12 professional 
categories. 
3. The minimum amount for contributory benefits is 75 % of the minimum 
wage (lOO % with dependents), and the upper bound is 170 % of the 
minimum wage (195 % with one dependant, and 220 % with two o more 
dependents) . 
2. Assistance system for workers with dependents 
2.1. Duration of benefits 
Period of Duration of benefits 

contribution 

1984 1989 1992 

1 2 months m. 

3 3 3 3 

4 4 4 4 

5 5 5 5 

6-11 Age< 45 18 18 21 

18 24 24
Age>=45 
>=12 Age< 45 18 24 24 

Age>=45 18 30 30 

1. Workers aged 45 years or older, without dependents, who received contributory 
benefits for 12 moths or longer are eligible for 6 months of assistance benefits. 
Since April 1992, all workers without dependents who made social security contributions 
for 6 or more months are eligible for 6 months of benefits. 
2. Workers aged 45 years or older who received contributory benefits for 24 months 
qualify for an additional period of 6 months. Since April 1992, workers younger than 
45 years who made contributions for 12-17 months (received contributory benefits for 
4 months) are eligible for 18 moths of benefits (24 months befare April 1992). 
3. Workers aged 52 years or older are eligible for benefits until retirement. 
4. The amount of assistance benefits is 75 % of the minimum wage. Since 1989, the 
benefit amount varies with the number of dependents for workers aged 45 or older 
only if they had received contributory benefits for 24 months: 75 % of the minimum 
wage (one or no dependentsl, 100 % (two dependents), and 125 % (three or more 
dependents) . 
